Gulf of Tonkin Incident
While the United States Government assured the population that the attack on the U.S. naval vessels was not provoked by the United States, solid evidence points in the other direction. The attack was provoked and retaliation from North Vietnam was entirely justifiable in this situation.
By manipulating the media for the eyes of the citizens, The American government tried desperately to cover up the fact that they had been dabbling in a situation they had no control over. The government coerced the media into feeding the citizens’ biases and beliefs to appease any unsettled minds in the American population. This appears strongly in an interview by NBC Television. The journalist interviewed the Secretary of State Dean Rusk on the recent attacks on the two United States vessels, the U.S.S. Maddox and the U.S.S. Turner Joy. He skirts around the idea, repeating his theory that “there is a great gulf of understanding between that world and ours” and “it’s very difficult to enter into each other’s minds across that great ideological gulf”. He ends the interview by finally hinting at his and the government's opinion, saying, “the essential fact was that our vessels were being attacked on the high seas by these boats”, and, “we had to do something about it” (Document 2). In the inspection of this document I discovered that he avoided the topic entirely until the end and even then hesitated to blatantly say what his perspective was. This is understandable in the situation, considering it was a television interview. He may have been obligated to limit what he said about his perspective by the government. Any hesitation on his part suggests there was some information withheld from the population, but one could possibly argue that it was for the greater good. The government wanted the population to stay unquestioning under their system, so any topic that could incite a lack of faith in the government would be avoided at all costs. The government upheld this façade because the public image needed to be positive to enhance the strength and support from the population.
When one looks back on the cables sent from the Maddox on the 2nd of August, some major questions should be asked about the attacks themselves. The captain of the Maddox suggested in these cables that there are “no actual visual
sightings by the Maddox” He even went as far as to say he wants to “suggest
complete evaluation before any further action taken” (Document 7). Captain Herrick
may have had little authority among the more prominent political figures discussing
this controversy, but he suggested anyway that the government of the United States
should consider the possibility that the attacks were non-existent before retaliating
towards North Vietnam on a fake pretense. The sourcing of this document shows
that he was most likely telling what he saw as the complete truth. A cable from a
ship is meant only to accurately communicate the situation with whomever the
captain is reporting to. There is little chance to lie in this situation because a cable is
meant for straight information to be reported to the waiting authorities. The attacks
on the Maddox were possibly imaginary, yet they were still used as an excuse by the
government to attack North Vietnam. Captain Herrick also implicitly expressed his
opposition to retaliation because “it is suspected that sonarman was hearing ship’s
own propeller beat” thus possibly classifying the attack as completely imaginary
(Document 7). Without an attack at all, the North Vietnamese may not have even
retaliated to the numerous “covert operations” (Document 3) by the U.S. that went
down in the area. President Johnson himself even admitted to provoking North
Vietnam. The Captain of the Maddox later confirms the attack was not imagined, but
this then leaves us with the question: Was this enough to incite a full-blown war?
The American government was already prepared for a war and the retaliation
from the Northern Vietnamese was the last straw in the start of the war. If the
damage done to the American vessels was in question, meaning that the damage
was somewhat minor, did the U.S. government really need to retaliate by forcing
everyone into war? The violent response to the minor damage was exaggerated,
and incited much suffering and misery through war. In his conversation with the
trusted former Secretary of the Treasury, the President admits to having some
“covert operations” go on in the area, and follows with the casual line thrown in,
“so I imagine they wanted to put a stop to it. So they… fired and we responded
immediately” (Document 3). These causal words thrown aside suggest the
President does not suspect this will result in war. When we read the silences of the
document, it was found that the conversation almost completely leaves out the other
perspective. Except for the small line mentioned above, the Northern Vietnamese
perspective is completely ignored in this conversation.
When we reach questions like this, it becomes a massive guessing game in
the search for the true history of the Gulf of Tonkin. Perhaps the North Vietnamese
perspective was left out because the U.S. government suspects that if they start
thinking of the enemy’s point of view they will become too emotionally attached in
understanding all of the perspectives. This would certainly result in some destruction
or deterioration, but the well-known quote as said in The Art of War, “know thine
enemy” was completely disregarded either in fear or in the over-estimation of
the need for extreme caution that could be the end of anyone. The attacks on
the Maddox and the Turner Joy were justified and entirely provoked as even the
President admitted to when speaking in confidence with trusted allies. In the end
the perspectives in question are so different from each other that the gray area
in between that we have been analyzing is of extreme depth filled with obscure
By manipulating the media for the eyes of the citizens, The American government tried desperately to cover up the fact that they had been dabbling in a situation they had no control over. The government coerced the media into feeding the citizens’ biases and beliefs to appease any unsettled minds in the American population. This appears strongly in an interview by NBC Television. The journalist interviewed the Secretary of State Dean Rusk on the recent attacks on the two United States vessels, the U.S.S. Maddox and the U.S.S. Turner Joy. He skirts around the idea, repeating his theory that “there is a great gulf of understanding between that world and ours” and “it’s very difficult to enter into each other’s minds across that great ideological gulf”. He ends the interview by finally hinting at his and the government's opinion, saying, “the essential fact was that our vessels were being attacked on the high seas by these boats”, and, “we had to do something about it” (Document 2). In the inspection of this document I discovered that he avoided the topic entirely until the end and even then hesitated to blatantly say what his perspective was. This is understandable in the situation, considering it was a television interview. He may have been obligated to limit what he said about his perspective by the government. Any hesitation on his part suggests there was some information withheld from the population, but one could possibly argue that it was for the greater good. The government wanted the population to stay unquestioning under their system, so any topic that could incite a lack of faith in the government would be avoided at all costs. The government upheld this façade because the public image needed to be positive to enhance the strength and support from the population.
When one looks back on the cables sent from the Maddox on the 2nd of August, some major questions should be asked about the attacks themselves. The captain of the Maddox suggested in these cables that there are “no actual visual
sightings by the Maddox” He even went as far as to say he wants to “suggest
complete evaluation before any further action taken” (Document 7). Captain Herrick
may have had little authority among the more prominent political figures discussing
this controversy, but he suggested anyway that the government of the United States
should consider the possibility that the attacks were non-existent before retaliating
towards North Vietnam on a fake pretense. The sourcing of this document shows
that he was most likely telling what he saw as the complete truth. A cable from a
ship is meant only to accurately communicate the situation with whomever the
captain is reporting to. There is little chance to lie in this situation because a cable is
meant for straight information to be reported to the waiting authorities. The attacks
on the Maddox were possibly imaginary, yet they were still used as an excuse by the
government to attack North Vietnam. Captain Herrick also implicitly expressed his
opposition to retaliation because “it is suspected that sonarman was hearing ship’s
own propeller beat” thus possibly classifying the attack as completely imaginary
(Document 7). Without an attack at all, the North Vietnamese may not have even
retaliated to the numerous “covert operations” (Document 3) by the U.S. that went
down in the area. President Johnson himself even admitted to provoking North
Vietnam. The Captain of the Maddox later confirms the attack was not imagined, but
this then leaves us with the question: Was this enough to incite a full-blown war?
The American government was already prepared for a war and the retaliation
from the Northern Vietnamese was the last straw in the start of the war. If the
damage done to the American vessels was in question, meaning that the damage
was somewhat minor, did the U.S. government really need to retaliate by forcing
everyone into war? The violent response to the minor damage was exaggerated,
and incited much suffering and misery through war. In his conversation with the
trusted former Secretary of the Treasury, the President admits to having some
“covert operations” go on in the area, and follows with the casual line thrown in,
“so I imagine they wanted to put a stop to it. So they… fired and we responded
immediately” (Document 3). These causal words thrown aside suggest the
President does not suspect this will result in war. When we read the silences of the
document, it was found that the conversation almost completely leaves out the other
perspective. Except for the small line mentioned above, the Northern Vietnamese
perspective is completely ignored in this conversation.
When we reach questions like this, it becomes a massive guessing game in
the search for the true history of the Gulf of Tonkin. Perhaps the North Vietnamese
perspective was left out because the U.S. government suspects that if they start
thinking of the enemy’s point of view they will become too emotionally attached in
understanding all of the perspectives. This would certainly result in some destruction
or deterioration, but the well-known quote as said in The Art of War, “know thine
enemy” was completely disregarded either in fear or in the over-estimation of
the need for extreme caution that could be the end of anyone. The attacks on
the Maddox and the Turner Joy were justified and entirely provoked as even the
President admitted to when speaking in confidence with trusted allies. In the end
the perspectives in question are so different from each other that the gray area
in between that we have been analyzing is of extreme depth filled with obscure